

## Paper titles and abstracts

Dan Arnold: "Perception and the Perceptible: Candrakīrti on the Difference an Adjective Makes"

In his most sustained critique of the epistemological project of Dignāga, Candrakīrti argues that the latter's peculiarly technical usage of the word *pratyakṣa* cannot make sense of the ordinary usage, according to which the word is an adjective (and not, as for Dignāga, a noun). Among the differences this makes is that the ordinary usage of the word recommends (against Dignāga) the conclusion that perception is always already conceptual. That Dignāga's account cannot be made consistent with our ordinary epistemic practices is further clarified if we consider what *is* "perceptible" for Dignāga; the intuitive plausibility of Dignāga's position is undermined by the recognition that his account really makes sense only as an idealist account.

Vincent Eltschinger: "Dharmakīrti, *Apoha*, and the Two Truths"

Dharmakīrti (600?) is well known for his dual system of epistemology: whereas perception relies on, and is caused by, real particulars, inference deals with conceptual constructs. The theory of *apoha* ("exclusion") is meant to account for the relation between perceptuality and conceptuality in bridging the gap between true but transient cognitions and ultimately erroneous but practically useful concepts and linguistic expressions. Generally regarded as a theory of language entailing a complex interplay of negations, the *apoha* theory has only rarely been addressed for what it really is, i.e., Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the Buddhist two truths/realities—an exegesis that his terminological choices make very explicit.

FUNAYAMA Toru: "Non-conceptuality through Repetition of Conceptual Meditation: Kamalaśīla's Theory of Yogic Perception"

Yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) was introduced by Dignāga (6<sup>th</sup> c.) and systematized by Dharmakīrti (7<sup>th</sup> c.) in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* school. However, neither of them figured out any concrete process or stage for the realization of yogic perception in meditational practice; it therefore remains unclear whether the above founders treated yogic perception as a mere theoretical possibility or as deeply rooted in their religious experience. Against this background, Kamalaśīla (8<sup>th</sup> c.) remarkably clarified that yogic perception is attained as a result of the long-term repetition of conceptual contemplation of Buddhist truths such as "everything in this world is momentary," and that this conceptual cognition transforms into a non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka/kalpanāpoḍha*), vivid (*spaṣṭa*) and direct experience at the moment of entering the first stage or the stage of joy (*pramuditā bhūmiḥ*) of the ten stages. This point is related with the attainability of yogic perception in actual practice. In this paper I will attempt to describe the essential points of Kamalaśīla's view by presenting significant passages of his *Bhāvanākrama* III and *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*.

Jonardon Ganeri: "Mindedness, *Saññā*, and the Epistemic Role of Experience"

It is the fifth century Yogācāra philosopher Dignāga who is to be held to account for introducing into the history of Buddhist philosophy of mind the Myth of the Given, that "fatal dichotomy between a supposedly brutally given, nonconceptual sensory content and free, rationally articulated belief" (Carman 2013: 167), when he reduced the role of concepts to pawns in the

game of inference with his celebrated redefinition of perceptual experience as that which is free from conceptual construction (*nirvikalpaka*). Bhartṛhari, Dignāga's senior, notoriously defends a precisely contrary thesis about the priority of language, that linguistic and conceptual ability pervades perceptual experience. Even a person who is absorbed in walking across a meadow, he says, and I will return to his example in the next section, will be sufficiently aware of the grass and the clods of earth as to be able to report them later, although at the time his or her experience contained only the "seeds of the disposition for speech" (*śabdabhāvanābīja*) and was not yet actually conceptually structured (*savikalpaka*) (*Vṛtti* on VP I.131). A prominent contemporary advocate of the Bhartṛhari thesis is John McDowell, for whom "to avoid making it unintelligible how the deliverances of sensibility can stand in grounding relations to paradigmatic exercises of the understanding such as judgements and beliefs ... we must insist that the understanding is already inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility themselves" (McDowell 1994: 46). The difficulty McDowell identifies with the idea that the content of perceptual experience is a bare Given is that such a view leaves us with no explanation of the manner in which experience can supply reasons for belief and judgement, so "when we trace justifications back, the last thing we come to is still a thinkable content; not something more ultimate than that, a bare pointing to a bit of the Given" (1994: 28–9). Perceptual encounters do provide beliefs and judgements with prima facie justification, and any account of the content of experience must be such as to explain how that can be the case. McDowell urges that this can be the case only if "distinctively human experience is actualization of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness" (2007: 348). So "mindedness pervades the lives of the rational animals we are, informing in particular our perceptual experience and our exercises of agency" (2013: 41).

The Theravāda Abhidhamma Buddhist philosophy of mind I will explore agrees with much of this argument. Like Bhartṛhari, and unlike Dignāga, it retains a firm grip on the idea that the contents of perceptual experience cannot be normatively inert, but must already have correctness conditions built in if experience is to have any role in the justification of belief. Part of my argument will be that we can recover an account of the correctness conditions appropriate to perceptual content through an analysis of the notions of "felt evaluation" (*vedanā*) and "identificatory labelling" (*saññā*), notions whose centrality is emphasised by classifying them as both fundamental commitments of consciousness and as distinct members of the five-fold scheme of aggregates. I will relate the claim that the content of perceptual experience has these two sorts of correctness condition with the constitutive role of two kinds of attention in experience, the kinds of attention called "singleness of mind" (*ekaggatā*) or "absorption" (*appanā*) and "bringing-to-mind" (*manasikāra*). The constitutive role of absorbed attention is to select phenomenal properties for felt evaluation in a world of solicitations, while the constitutive role of "bringing-to-mind" or focal attention is to access categorical properties for reidentification in a world of determinate objects. The Buddhist term for the content of perception, *ārammaṇa*, serves to refer to both levels of the world disclosed by experience.

Jay Garfield: "Thinking Beyond Thought: Tsongkhapa and Mipham on the Conceptualized Ultimate"

I consider the distinction between *don dam rnam grangs ma yin pa* and *rnam grangs pa'i don dam* (*apāryayaparamārtha* and *pāryayaparamārtha*—the noncategorized and the categorized ultimate) as it is deployed by Tsongkhapa on the one hand and Mipham and Bötrül on the other in their respective attempts to explicate the distinction between nonconceptual ultimate and conceptual understanding of ultimate truth. Tsongkhapa argues that the distinction is grounded in the subject, and Mipham and Bötrül that it is grounded in the object. I argue that Tsongkhapa gets this roughly right.

Sonam Kachru: "Who's Afraid of Non-Conceptual Content? Rehabilitating Dignāga's Criterion for what is Perceptually Evident"

This essay offers a new interpretation of Dignāga's appeal to non-conceptual content when defining perception, or as a criterion for what is perceptually evident. I will present reasons to eschew the admittedly tempting line of interpretation on which Dignāga was motivated by the same sorts of considerations which led epistemologists in our own time to speak, whether in praise or blame, of something 'given'. Once we resist this temptation, and keeping in mind Dignāga's novel characterization of what conceptuality involves, we might allow ourselves a fresh reconstruction of the motivations underlying Dignāga's contrast between conceptual and non-conceptual content. I will propose the following way of putting things. Dignāga's contrast between conceptual and non-conceptual content might very well be read as part of a programmatic attempt to tease apart two analytically distinct yet co-present elements that Dignāga admits are fused in our pre-theoretical conception of experience (exemplifying what is worth calling 'concrete intentionality'). The two elements, as resolved by Dignāga's criteria of conceptual and non-conceptual content, are, respectively, the ability to use and respond to reasons, and phenomenal presence. When evaluating whether or not a mental episode is 'directed' to the world, the idea of *consciousness* in experience turns out to be an idle wheel. And when attempting to isolate what it is in an experience that marks it out as an experience, as, that is, an instance of consciousness, we must allow that to which we are directed in thought or language to fall, as it were, out of focus, thereby bringing something else into view. And the analytic work is not thereby done: what is brought into view, phenomenal presence, turns out to be rather phenomenologically rich for Dignāga—neither without structure, nor contentless, ultimately finding its final characterization in Dignāga's gloss on experience being non-transparent and reflexive. If Dignāga's way of handling conceptual content is novel, so too is his phenomenological recovery of this domain of phenomenal presence.

KENG Ching: "Does the Cognition of Blueness-cum-Yellowness Involve *Vikalpa*?"

This paper begins with this question: Why did the Ābhidharmikas insist that sense perception is accompanied with some minimum sense of *vikalpa* (i.e., *svabhāva-vikalpa*), but Dignāga and later Yogācāra thinkers deviated from this to insisting that sense perception is without *vikalpa* (*kalpanāpoḍha*)? Intriguingly, it is noteworthy that the Abhidharma and Yogācāra thinkers also hold contrasting views about the relationship between sense perception and *vitarka*: sense perception is always accompanied by *vitarka* according to the former, but not at all according to the latter. Given that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* identifies *svabhāva-vikalpa* with *vitarka*, the above two contrasts are closely related: For the Abhidharma, sense perception is regarded as *sa-vikalpa* because it is *sa-vitarka*.

So then the question is: What is the nature of *vitarka* in the case of sense perception? And why does *vitarka* involve *vikalpa* in sense perception?

The first possibility of reading *vitarka* is: Since sense perception does not cognize really existent entities (*dravya*)—i.e., atoms (*paramāṇu*) in the Abhidharmic realist context—but rather a collection of atoms, sense perception seems to necessarily involve *vikalpa*. But I argue that this is not the proper reading because both the Ābhidharmikas and Yogācārins invent the notion of sense fields qua particulars (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*) to insist that a collection of atoms still counts as a particular, and hence there is no *vikalpa* involved in the sense perception of it.

Different from the previous case, I argue that *vitarka* should be understood in the case where a sense field consisting of a dimension, a blueness of a certain length and width for example, is perceived. In this case, at least two things are necessarily involved: a collection of sense fields qua particulars and a demarcation of the boundary thereof. For the latter, a distinction between two colors, say, blueness against the background of yellowness, is necessary. I argue that this should be taken as the function of *vitarka* in sense perception: To tell certain blueness apart from certain yellowness, and in so far as there is a distinction, there is *vikalpa* involved.

But then how could the Yogācārins separate this very fundamental cognitive function from sense perception? This is because they stipulate the notion of mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses (*mānasa-pratyakṣa* in Dignāga and *wuju yishi* 五俱意識 in Kuiji) so that *vitarka* is ascribed to the mental perception rather than to sense perception. This is why the *Cheng weishi lun* claims that the five sensory consciousnesses are without *vitarka* but the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses is. Even with this new Yogācāra move, *vitarka* should still be regarded as non-conceptual because no conceptualization and verbalization is involved, not even the very notions of "blueness" and "yellowness." Another support for this is that even small kids with no linguistic capability can still tell blueness apart from yellowness.

I end this paper with a call for a clarification of the term *vikalpa*. In my understanding, three different senses should be distinguished: (1) *vikalpa* qua non-conceptual distinction: e.g., a distinction of blueness from yellowness; (2) *vikalpa* qua conceptualization and verbalization: e.g., the conceptualization in terms of the language of an entity (*dharma*) and self (*ātman*); (3) *vikalpa* qua bifurcation: e.g., the bifurcation into the noetic and noematic aspects (*darśana-bhāga* vs. *nimitta-bhāga*; or *svābhāsa* vs. *arthābhāsa*), as exemplified in the notion of non-discriminating cognition (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*). For both Ābhidharmikas and Yogācārins, the first is harmless for liberation and hence is usually not made the focus while discussing *vikalpa*.

Jowita Kramer: "Conceptuality in Yogācāra Thought"

This paper will investigate Yogācāra accounts of "conceptuality" and "non-conceptuality," as well as the relation between the perceived object and its verbal expression. The process of thinking and conceptualizing has repeatedly been in the focus of attention of Yogācāra authors and is discussed in some detail in works such as the *\*Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣa*, the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* and the *Mahāyānasamgraha*. My presentation will focus on various terms related to these processes including "concept" (*vikalpa*), "ideation" (*saṃjñā*), "mental cognition" (*manovijñāna*) and "mental talk" (*manojalpa*) and will also explore Yogācāra interpretations of non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) states.

LIN Qian: "The *Mahānidāna-sūtra* and Conceptual Thinking in Early Buddhism"

The *Mahānidāna-sūtra* is considered one of the most important early sūtras teaching the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). However, later Buddhist commentaries to this sūtra regarding its nine-linked formula of dependent origination, and the interdependency between consciousness (*vijñāna*) and name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*) have caused inconsistencies and difficulties in their Abhidharma systems. The first part of this paper examines different versions of the *Mahānidāna-sutta* preserved in Pāli and Chinese translations that are related to the Theravāda, the Sarvāstivāda, and the Dharmaguptaka traditions. The textual comparison of the variations in the passages describing name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*) and the two kinds of contacts

(*sparsā*) in the sūtra demonstrates how doctrinal positions may influence the forms of the text. Based on the textual study in the previous part, the second part proposes that the three links in the formula of dependent origination, namely, consciousness (*viññāna*), name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), and contact (*sparsā*), may better be understood as a description of a fundamental conceptual cognitive process underlying not only every mental activity in a sentient being's life, but also the coming to be of the sentient being, the beginning of saṃsāra. Such an understanding of these sūtra passages provides a theory of conceptual thinking different from the one proposed in early Abhidharma texts, but somehow close to the Yogācāra analysis of the grasper (*grāhaka*) and what is grasped (*grāhya*). Finally, the paper proposes that the interdependent relationship between *viññāna* and *nāma-rūpa* may be understood as a representational theory of mind.

Patrick McAllister: "A Buddhist Account of the Simultaneity of Perceptual and Conceptual Awareness Events"

The theory of *apoha* plays an important role in the epistemological and logical system developed by the Buddhist Dignāga and his followers in ancient India. It is a solution to the problem of universals, and posits that any commonness amongst real things is only a function of their difference: instead of assuming essential and intrinsic properties that things really share, this commonness is stated to be always reducible to the more fundamental notion of exclusion (*apoha*): two things are the same only insofar as they are excluded from a third set of things.

Whilst the ontological and logical aspects of this theory have, by and large, been clarified in modern scholarship, many of the epistemological problems arising from it have not yet been understood very well. A central objection is often one from direct experience: How can these Buddhists claim that a cognition has exclusion as its object, when everything in such a cognition is presented positively?

From amongst the many complexities in the Buddhists' explanation of this stark difference between what appears and what is the case, I would like to present an important element from one of the latest proponents of this strand of philosophy. It pertains to the temporal structure of a conceptual cognition in which an exclusion is presented as a positive property. Ratnakīrti, an 11th century Buddhist, insists that the two aspects are simultaneous, and that these are in fact contained in every event of (unenlightened) awareness, thus somewhat undermining the traditional Buddhist differentiation of conceptual cognition versus perceptual cognition.

To analyse this material I will be making use of Edmund Husserl's theory of temporal consciousness: it is well in line with the central Buddhist ontological tenet of momentariness, and also provides an easy entry point to modern phenomenological approaches to conceptual and perceptual awareness.

Evan Thompson: "What's In a Concept? Conceptualizing the Conceptual in Buddhist Philosophy and Cognitive Science"

Is there or can there be nonconceptual experience or is all experience by nature conceptually structured? Do certain kinds of conscious experiences occur prior to the workings of cognition (attention, memory, thought) or does the content of a mental event become conscious only by virtue of the workings of cognition? These sorts of questions have been posed in many different philosophical contexts, cultures, and languages. In Buddhist philosophy, they are central to Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika controversies about perception (*pratyakṣa*) and to Pramāṇavāda accounts of immediate experience (*pratyakṣa*) versus mental construction (*kalpanā*). In Indian philosophy altogether, they lie at the heart of the debates between the Buddhist Pramāṇavādins

and the Nyāya realists. In European and Anglo-American philosophy, they derive from Kant and inform numerous discussions in both the analytic and phenomenological traditions. They are also central issues in cognitive science. A recurrent problem in contemporary discussions of these questions, however, is the lack of a generally accepted account of what concepts are. Clearly, in the absence of a precise specification of what a concept is, the notion of nonconceptual experience is equally ill-defined. This problem carries over into the study of Buddhist philosophy. For example, "concept" is routinely used to translate the Buddhist philosophical term *vikalpa*, and "conceptualization" is often used to render *kalpanā*; accordingly, *nirvikalpa* is rendered as "nonconceptual" and *kalpanāpoḍha* as "devoid of conceptualization." But what exactly does "conceptual" mean in this context? Does it mean linguistic? Does it mean a recognitional capacity—the capacity to re-identify something, to cognize it as an instance of a kind or type—a capacity that need not be linguistic or require the possession of language? Buddhist scholars sometimes gloss the conceptual (*vikalpa*, *kalpanā*) as anything mentally added to the "given," but this raises the contentious issue of exactly what the "given" is supposed to be. Moreover, the term "given" is an Anglo-American philosophical term of art. It comes from Wilfrid Sellars (1956), who argued against what he called the "myth of the given." By this he meant the idea that anything that was somehow imparted nonconceptually and noninferentially could provide a basis for knowledge. In calling this idea a "myth," Sellars contended not only that there is no given in experience but that there cannot be. Buddhist scholars have used Sellars to interpret and evaluate various Buddhist philosophical views: Tom Tillemans (2003) argues that Buddhist logicians and Svātantrikas subscribe to the "given," whereas Candrakīrti rejects it as a myth; Dan Arnold (2012) also reads Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as relying on the notion of the "given," and uses arguments from Sellars and John McDowell to criticize them; and Jay Garfield (2014) describes Buddhist philosophy overall as a progressive critique of ever more sophisticated conceptions of the "given." Nevertheless, despite Sellars's arguments, contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists disagree about the nature and role of concepts in experience, and in particular about whether accounting for experience requires appealing to some notion of nonconceptual content. This complex, cross-cultural philosophical milieu sets the context for my paper. My main concern is to call attention to the need for more precision in specifying what "concepts," "conceptual," and "nonconceptual" mean when we bring Buddhist philosophy into dialogue and debate with contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. To that end, I will review various cognitive science views of concepts and relate them to both Abhidharma and Pramāṇavāda accounts of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and cognition (*viññāna*).

Roy Tzohar: "Enjoy the Silence: The Relation between Non-conceptual Awareness and Inexpressibility According to Some Yogācāra Sources"

The paper deals with the way in which early Indian Yogācāra treatises understand the relations between non-conceptual awareness (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) and the inexpressibility (*nirabhilāpya*) of the true nature of reality. Viewed in light of certain sources, such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga* along with its commentaries, these relations may be roughly represented in the following manner: non-conceptual awareness stands for a viable and concrete experience for Yogācāra Buddhists; this experience is understood as an insight into the inexpressible nature of reality and hence as validating an ineffable ontology; which at the conventional level can be justified by reasoning that counters the expressibility of anything (specifically, by attacking a correspondence theory of truth and culminating with what Garfield and Priest (2003) pointed out as "Limit contradictions").

This description, though consistent, is not as homogenous as one might expect. Different sections in the same Yogācāra sources reveal a much more intricate set of relations. For instance, in some instances philosophical argumentation regarding the inexpressibility of reality is understood not as a mere justification but as itself constituting a practice for bringing about such realization; in other cases it is seen as neither, since it is understood as a post-factum performance of the non-conceptual awareness once it has already been acquired by the Bodhisattva.

In this paper I survey these different schemes, explore the possibility they hold for conceiving philosophical inquiry as both a practice and a performance, and spell out some of the implications of this view for a question that rings out beyond Yogācāra circles – namely, How, if at all, can non-conceptual experiences be communicated.

YAMABE Nobuyoshi: "The Position of Conceptualization in the Context of the Yogācāra *Bīja* Theory"

In the early model of the Yogācāra *bīja* theory, *bīja* seems to have been closely associated with *dhātu*, which, in this context, refers to the capacity of all the *dharmas* to generate the same respective elements in the subsequent moment. These *dhātus* (= *bījas*) exist originally and do not presuppose our act of conceptualization. This early *bīja* model, however, appears to have been superseded later by the *vāsanā* model. *Vāsanā* here means the residue of our conceptualization that can give rise to corresponding *dharmas* at a later time. In this model, conceptualization is the fundamental basis of the world we live in. This paper will discuss the historical development of the Yogācāra model of *bīja/vāsanā* focusing on the role of conceptualization. The significance of non-conceptual wisdom will also be discussed in the same context.